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Abstract 
Drawing on a local study on Nepal’s Terai, this paper explores the nature of livelihood exposure 
to shocks and stresses amongst rural households in two Village Development Committees in 
Sunsari District. The primary data are derived from a 117 household survey supplemented by 19 
purposefully sampled follow-up interviews. The paper opens with a discussion of the changing 
nature of exposure in the global South, distinguishing between inherited vulnerability and 
produced precarity. We then provide background to the research site and the research 
methods. In the core empirical part of the paper we unravel and distinguish between the 
livelihood threats and opportunities faced by households in the area and use these to reflect on 
the nature of ‘exposure’, its historical origins and contemporary (re)production. The final part of 
the paper uses the Nepal case to build a more general argument, proposing that if we are to 
understand the puzzle of continued livelihood exposure and uncertainty in the context of 
aggregate economic expansion we need to identify and interrogate the processes that may, at 
the same time, produce wealth and reduce vulnerability, while also generating precarity. 
 
Keywords: Nepal, livelihoods, vulnerability, precarity, resilience 
 
1. Introduction 
Central to the sustainable livelihoods approach is vulnerability (Chambers and Conway, 1991; 
Chambers, 1988, Ashley and Carney, 1999). Development, particularly in rural areas of the 
global South, has been predicated on the assumption that poor households are poor at least in 
part because they are vulnerable (Wisner et al., 2004). If people – or rather, households – are 
vulnerable then their livelihoods cannot be regarded as sustainable (Scoones, 2009). 
Vulnerability is, in turn, seen to be associated with political and social marginalisation, physical 
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and environmental exposure, spatial isolation, limited human and social capital, and inadequate 
physical (especially land) and financial assets (Wisner et al., 2004). Poverty is a state of being, 
usually assessed at the household level according to some money-metric measure, and usually 
determined according to a poverty ‘line’. Vulnerability, on the other hand, has a forward-looking 
and predictive quality. It highlights why individuals or households might be prone to poverty. 
Vulnerable individuals or households need not be poor, although the poor are invariably 
vulnerable. Development interventions help address one or more of these facets of vulnerability 
whether through, for example, micro-credit schemes, investments in schools and training 
initiatives, programmes of empowerment, rural road building and access schemes, or land 
titling. In these ways, ‘development’ helps to reduce the vulnerability of marginal and 
(potentially) poor groups, thereby contributing to achieving sustainable livelihoods. 
 
The aspects of vulnerability that are addressed by such mainstream development interventions 
are not infrequently seen to be inheritances of the past. Poverty, therefore is, in a real sense, 
‘old’ (Rigg, 2005). It lies in a set of inherited conditions and tendencies which development 
interventions can address whether through education, roads, technology, money or training. 
The underpinning logic here is the need to bring people into the mainstream and, more 
particularly, to connect them to the market (Rigg and Oven, 2015). Vulnerability, therefore, 
tends to be viewed as a reflection of a pre-existing state of marginality or exposure, whether 
social (e.g. caste or gender relations), physical (e.g. isolation), environmental (e.g. unimproved 
land or water resources) or economic (e.g. lack of market engagement or access to financial 
resources). Mainstream development tends not to pay great attention to the ways in which 
contemporary processes of development may themselves be marginalising.  
 
This paper explores the intersections between inherited ‘old’ poverty and produced ‘new’ 
poverty among households on southern Nepal’s lowland Terai (Illustration 1). It proposes that 
economic expansion generates new forms of livelihood risk. The fact that aggregate economic 
growth is not neatly and equally translated into resilient and more sustainable livelihoods is well 
known, but this is usually put down to the unequal distribution of the benefits of growth, thus 
requiring that more attention be paid to strategies of ‘pro-poor’, ‘inclusive’ or ‘shared’ growth 
(Best, 2013). Here we suggest that there is a further complication to the idée fixe of growth: that 
it also produces new forms and manifestations of vulnerability and, therefore, the non-
achievement of sustainable livelihoods may lie in how contemporary processes of growth 
becoming imprinted, in livelihood terms, at the individual, household and settlement levels. 
 
[ILLUSTRATION 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 
The Nepal development context 
Nepal has experienced significant development gains since 1951, when the development 
‘project’ was first set in train and development assistance began. There has been, for example, a 
dramatic decline in under-five mortality from 323 to 36 deaths per 1,000 between 1960 and 
2013, and a near doubling of life expectancy from 35 to 68 years over the same period. Adult 
literacy has improved from 21 per cent of the adult population in 1980 to 60 per cent in 2010. 
Set against such indicators of improvement, however, can be arrayed a good deal of evidence to 
suggest that, overall, the successes in comparative terms have been modest, even 
disappointing. Nepal remains one of the world’s 48 ‘least’ developed countries, and 37 per cent 
of the population live on less than $.1.51 a day (ADB, 2014), even after more than sixty years of 
‘development’. 
 
Households in rural Nepal face numerous challenges to building sustainable and resilient 
livelihoods. Social inequality based on caste and ethnicity remain severe (Sunam and McCarthy, 
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2016; Cameron, 1998); spatial inequalities – which were one of the main causes of the decade-
long civil conflict – are considerable (von Einsiedel et al., 2012); the geography and physical 
environment of Nepal present numerous challenges, both local and national (Blaikie et al., 
1980); and geophysical and hydro-meteorological hazards including earthquakes, landslides and 
floods pose significant threats, as the recent 2015 Gorkha earthquake and the 2008 Koshi floods 
exemplify. Such is the paucity of local opportunities for income generation in the country that 
international labour migration has become key to sustaining livelihoods (Seddon et al. 2000; 
Blaikie et al., 2002; Shakya, 2013; Sunam, 2014). In 2009 around one-third of households had a 
member living in another country and some 15 per cent of working age males were working 
overseas in 2003-4, mostly in one of the Gulf States and Malaysia (Maharjan et al., 2012). In 
2013, personal remittances were equivalent to almost 30 per cent of GDP (World Bank data),1 
almost double the value of the country’s exports (World Bank, 2014).   
 
Development interventions in Nepal have generally been based on the development gaps and 
absences, and the underpinning logics, set out above (Pigg, 1993). They have sought, in other 
words, to address identified geographies of dearth related to physical isolation, inadequate 
service provision, low incomes and in some fields limited (or low quality) human capital, and 
which have, in turn, been instrumental in perpetuating vulnerability and shaping people’s 
meagre living. Such approaches to development have been fairly universal, with critics arguing 
that development often “tailor[s] its description of a country’s problems to fit the measurement 
of the solutions it has to offer” (Pigg, 1993: 47; see also Ferguson, 1990). There is a (often 
backward-looking) normative logic to development policies, where identified interventions are 
related to predetermined development problems that, in turn, are linked at a higher level to 
ideological framings that are close to dogma. In contemporary critical analyses these are often 
seen to be tied to ‘neoliberal’ perspectives that shape the framing of problems and their 
solution but in the past there were equally influential alternatives, not least models of state-led 
development. There is, in other words, a degree of wishful thinking in each development 
decade’s identification of the problem and the solution, with the latter often preceding the 
former. 
 
The top five sectors receiving development assistance in Nepal in 2011/12 were education, local 
development, road transportation, electricity and health (Ministry of Finance 2013). The UK 
Department for International Development’s (DFID’s) operational plan for the period 2011-152 
identifies the need to address the ongoing political instability which is considered key to the 
success of its wealth creation programmes. Emphasis is placed on supporting the private sector 
with programmes in agriculture and tourism, including skills training and enterprise financing. 
The number of jobs created and the length of roads built or maintained are seen as indicators of 
wealth creation and thus of development success. Similarly, Asian Development Bank (ADB) 
projects have focused on roads to strengthen domestic and regional connectivity, linking 
remote villages to schools and hospitals and providing farmers with access to markets.3  The 
World Bank is likewise supporting economic growth by, amongst other things, enhancing 
                                                          
1
 Data accessed from http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/BX.TRF.PWKR.DT.GD.ZS.  
2
 DFID Nepal (2012) Operational Plan 2011-2015, DFID Nepal. Refreshed May 2012.  Accessed: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/67361/nepal-2011.pdf  
3
 Asian Development Bank and Nepal: http://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/publication/27783/nep.pdf 
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transport connectivity and improving the business environment.4 These patterns of concern and 
interest and the development interventions that result are not peculiar to Nepal; they are 
repeated across the global South and reflect the received (often predetermined) wisdom of 
where the development ‘gaps’ lie. 
 
Such interventions may well be, overall and in aggregate economic terms, developmental. 
Money-metric poverty rates in Nepal, for example, have fallen markedly and this must be 
counted a considerable achievement (Figure 1). However there are three important wrinkles to 
this generalisation and the assumed links between intervention and outcome which this paper 
explores. First of all, such interventions have differential effects on societal groups – on men 
versus women, on the old versus the young, and on minority groups versus the majority, for 
instance. In some instances they may even be harmful for some groups (see, on Nepal, Sunam 
and McCarthy, 2016). Second, while such interventions may indeed address some aspects of 
vulnerability, in so doing they change the texture of livelihoods. In other words, they alter not 
just the amount of production, income or return, but also the means and methods by which 
these are generated and their social distribution and environmental consequences. This then 
leads to a third wrinkle: in reducing vulnerability, interventions sometimes also have the effect 
of introducing or increasing ‘precarity’. The result may be that in addressing old poverty, 
interventions may generate new forms and articulations of poverty. It is with respect to this 
third issue that the paper pays particular attention. 
 
[FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
  
2. Framing vulnerability and precarity 
The vulnerability of rural households in many poor countries to environmental, social, political 
and/or economic change has become a leitmotif of livelihood studies. This scholarship can be 
sub-divided into three slightly different strands of work: studies that focus on vulnerability, 
politics, violence and security (e.g. Korf, 2004); work that pays special attention to vulnerability, 
environmental change and natural hazards (e.g. Wisner et al., 2004, Adger, 2006, Cannon et al., 
2003); and, finally, research that examines the socio-economic (including historical) roots of 
vulnerability (e.g. Bankoff, 2001, Hickey and du Toit, 2007, Ambinakudige, 2009). Arising from 
this desire to build an understanding of livelihood vulnerability, is the corollary wish to identify 
strategies of ‘coping’ (Ellis, 1998). Cross-cutting all these three strands of work, scholarship on 
livelihoods in the global South also sometimes examines the gendered (Francis, 2002), 
generational (Bounthong et al., 2004), spatial (Agergaard et al., 2010) and sectoral (Ellis, 2000) 
permutations that comprise making a living. What, we argue, is more rarely undertaken is an 
interrogation of the changing roots of vulnerability and the different processes through which 
vulnerability is produced and reproduced. As we develop in the discussion that follows, the 
argument we make is that vulnerability is not merely accentuated or ameliorated over time, but 
is re-worked because the causes, dynamics and texture of vulnerability also changes. We frame 
and highlight these changes by drawing a distinction between vulnerability and precarity. 
 
In most livelihood studies, rural people, as it were, are the dependent variable and change is 
foisted on them either by events (earthquakes, floods), processes (soil erosion, marketization), 
states (land settlement), or society (dispossession, social exclusion). To put it another way, rural 
                                                          
4
 World Bank Group Partnership Strategy for Nepal – Unlocking constraints to growth: 
http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2014/06/20/world-bank-group-partnership-strategy-for-
nepal-unlocking-constraints-to-growth 
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people are the victims of external or imposed processes, whether these are economic, social, 
political or environmental.  
 
The influential sustainable livelihoods approach (SLA) or framework (SLF), for example, has the 
‘vulnerability context’ as the starting point for understanding rural people, their conditions and 
potentials. This is not to suggest that populations in the global South are caught in a structural 
web of threats and constraints, over which they have little control or influence. The poor have a 
degree of agency and the ability to shape and direct outcomes in particular ways (Moser 1998, 
Bohle 2007). Indeed, the SLF emerged out of dissatisfaction with structurally-ordained 
interpretations of people’s living conditions and their assumed limited scope for change 
(Chambers and Conway, 1991; Ashley and Carney, 1999; Scoones, 2009). More widely, the 
participatory turn in development from the 1980s was given impetus by an analogous 
frustration with expert-led, technology-driven and top-down interventions that ignored the 
priorities and concerns of the subjects of development, namely poor women and men. 
 
The ability to cope with (absorb) and recover from stresses and shocks or, on the other hand, to 
adapt and adjust in the face of such stresses and shocks are essential qualities of sustainable or 
resilient livelihoods. Some scholars have paid attention to “the agency that poor people possess 
to live with vulnerability… highlight[ing] the capabilities of the vulnerable to secure their 
livelihoods rather than their weaknesses and failures to do so” (Bohle, 2007: 9). It is, however, 
when human systems (or livelihoods) cannot either cope with and recover or adapt and adjust 
that they can be viewed, ex post facto, as vulnerable (Scoones, 1998: 6; Bohle, 2007). Scoones 
(2009) in his rural livelihoods review paper states that “sustainability and resilience thus cannot 
always emerge through local adaptation in conditions of extreme vulnerability.  … [requiring] 
more dramatic reconfigurations of livelihoods” in response. Existing livelihood practices and 
systems may not be sufficient to address emerging challenges – household and individual 
adaptive capacities may be inadequate – thus requiring either intervention by external actors or 
livelihood transformation (rather than livelihood adaptation). There are limits to human agency.  
 
2.1 From vulnerability to precarity 
In this paper we propose, drawing on the case of Nepal, that market integration has re-worked 
the nature of vulnerability for many rural-based households. In doing so, we make links 
between the three strands of work in livelihood studies identified above. It is not so much that 
households, with development, have escaped their prior condition of vulnerability, with an 
accompanying strengthening of their resilience in the form of ‘sustainable’ livelihoods; rather, 
resilient or sustainable livelihoods need to be seen in a triangular relationship with (possibly) 
declining vulnerability on the one hand and (possibly) growing precarity on the other.  For 
example, rural-based households may benefit in the short-term from development 
interventions promoting debt-financed cash crop production but this may leave them open to 
market shocks in the medium and long-term, thereby raising the possibility of foreclosure and 
accentuating their precarity (Rigg and Oven, 2015). The challenge, then, is to identify the 
causalities, structural as well as stochastic, that might account for declining vulnerability 
alongside increasing precarity. This, we argue, has relevance across the global South.    
 
Precarity is a word that has come into increasing use in the global North, in connection with the 
marginal working conditions that have emerged under conditions of late capitalism. For Guy 
Standing, a new class has emerged, the precariat, which: 
 
“…consists of people who have minimal trust relationships with capital or the state, making 
it quite unlike the salariat. And it has none of the social contract relationships of the 
proletariat, whereby labour securities were provided in exchange for subordination and 
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contingent loyalty, the unwritten deal underpinning welfare states” (Standing, 2013: 2 and 
see Standing, 2008, 2011, 2012). 
 
Some scholars (e.g. Munck, 2013) have objected to the use of precarity and the precariat in the 
context of the global South, where marginality, informality and social exclusion are seen to 
more accurately describe the nature of class relations and class-making. Even so, scholars have 
begun to appropriate ideas of precarity and apply them to countries and contexts in the global 
South.5 For example, in his work on rural India, Breman (2007) refers to the precarious nature of 
non-farm employment which often involves migration and which has produced new forms of 
poverty, marginalisation or precarity for individuals and households. Wood (2000) highlights the 
challenges faced by poor people searching for livelihood security who are forced to invest in 
short-term livelihood strategies that create negative social capital as opposed to longer-term 
strategic planning. That said, there remain few examples of studies that apply notions of 
precarity in the global South, including in the case of Nepal.6 One exception is Sunam and 
McCarthy’s (2016) study which uses the term in an examination of the impacts of foreign labour 
migration on the rural labour force and thus on poverty and which highlights the contradictory 
nature of migration as a livelihood strategy.   
 
Notions of precarity are linked to two other threads of literature: that on ‘adverse 
incorporation’ on the one hand, and ‘immiserising growth’ on the other. Both pay attention to 
the means by which the extension of market relations can harm (as well as assist) certain groups 
and individuals. Hickey and du Toit (2007: 4), for example, seek to understand how “localised 
livelihood strategies are enabled and constrained by economic, social and political relations over 
both time and space”. Importantly, such effects are not seen as haphazard, but structurally 
linked to the operation of the market economy; as Mosse puts it, “the poverty of certain 
categories of people is not just unimproved by growth or integration into (global) markets, but 
deepened by it” (2010: 1161). We use the vulnerability/precarity diptych because it provide us 
with the opportunity to consider how processes and structures rooted in different times and 
spaces intersect in the construction and sustainability of contemporary livelihoods on Nepal’s 
Terai.   
 
In the context of this paper, then, we are not simply using precarity in a geographical context – 
Nepal – where, hitherto, it has rarely been employed. Rather, we use precarity as a means to 
distinguish between two forms of livelihood exposure in the context of a range of shocks and 
stresses, be they environmental (e.g. earthquakes), political (e.g. the blockade of the Nepal-
India border), economic (e.g. declining returns to farming), or social (e.g. multi-sited 
households). We use the term vulnerability to refer to inherited or traditional forms of 
livelihood exposure; and precarity to denote produced or modern forms of such exposure (Table 
1). Thus the former addresses the causes of old poverty noted above, while the latter pays 
attention to new poverty, created by processes of development. Both, however, have 
implications for building sustainable livelihoods. Vulnerability in the guise of physical isolation, 
for example, may limit access to state services; while precarity in the form of market 
dependency or high levels of debt, may expose households to the loss of their land. We do not 
                                                          
5
 See, for example, two special issues of the American Behavioral Scientist (57[3] and 57[4] 2013) on 
precarious work in East, South and Southeast Asia. 
6
 Pande’s (2014) paper on international domestic labour migrants in the Lebanon also employs notions of 
precarity and some of her interviewees were from Nepal. 
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suggest there has been a simple sequencing from a former situation of vulnerability to a latter 
day context of precarity, under conditions of socio-economic transformation (or development). 
While the direction of movement may be taking that path (i.e. towards greater relative precarity 
in the context of generally declining vulnerability), it is quite conceivable for households and 
sites to exhibit continuing vulnerability even while precarity also grows, so they are doubly 
exposed. Furthermore, households in individual settlements will not be equally vulnerable or 
precarious and we also recognise that the distinction between vulnerability and precarity is, in 
practice, far from clear-cut. The utility of distinguishing between the two, we suggest, is that 
each pays attention to rather different causal processes and thereby encourages an 
appreciation of the contradictory livelihood effects of growth/development strategies that 
emphasise the market imperative and tend to measure success in terms of aggregate economic 
outcomes without paying due heed to how these economic process come to rest in people lives 
and their livelihoods. 
 
The nature of livelihood exposure engendered by vulnerability and/or precarity is seen to be 
different, and different across a range of explanatory contexts: their geographical and sectoral 
location; the historical processes that reproduce each; and the social groups (ethnic, caste, 
gender and generational) that are specifically affected, for example. Table 1 sets out how 
significantly different processes underpin the sorts of livelihoods exposures that emerge under 
each set of conditions and how, therefore, the production and reproduction of ‘old’ and ‘new’ 
poverty are, similarly, different. 
 
[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 
3. Research sites and methods 
The field research on which this paper draws focused on two Village Development Committees 
(VDCs) in Sunsari District in the Koshi Region in Eastern Nepal: Aurabani and Prakashpur (Figure 
2). 
 
[FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
In Aurabani the population was predominantly Tharu, an ethnic group indigenous to the Terai, 
with smaller numbers of high caste hill-Brahmin. Householders relied largely on subsistence 
agriculture, farming the land of absentee landlords either through sharecropping arrangements 
or wage labouring. This was supplemented by day-wage labour including house construction, 
transporting goods and factory work in the nearby urban centres of Ithari, Inaruwa and 
Biratnagar. A number of households also had family members working overseas, mainly in Qatar 
and Malaysia. In terms of the hazards context, the research site was near to the Main Boundary 
Thrust fault capable of generating magnitude 8 earthquakes. However, the flat terrain and 
single story adobe buildings reduce the risk. In the past, waterlogging posed a notable threat to 
crops but the construction of a drainage system has largely addressed this problem.           
 
Like Aurabani, Prakashpur is close to the Main Boundary Thrust and is therefore exposed to 
earthquake hazard. It is also, however, bisected by the Koshi River (Figure 2), and several wards 
were seriously affected by the 2008 Koshi flood disaster. Compared to Aurabani, Prakashpur is 
wealthier, and in-migrants from Udaypur, Khotang and other hill districts come here for the 
employment opportunities that are available locally, at least compared to more remote 
locations, and the better access to state services and amenities. Resident households rely 
largely on subsistence agriculture and the failure of farming to meet household needs leads to 
significant flows of international migrants, largely of men to Malaysia and Qatar.  
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Earthquakes are considered by local people in both VDCs as an important hazard, but not as a 
priority risk. Floods are a much more immediate threat, especially in Prakashpur. With just two 
per cent of houses in the VDC built of brick and cement, and the remainder made of traditional 
adobe constructions (Illustration 2), people feel safe, even should the area experience a major 
earthquake. Since the 1970s, the Koshi Region of Eastern Nepal has been the target of 
development assistance by the Government of Nepal and international donors. In line with the 
high level development narrative set out above, roads have been constructed to provide access 
to markets and reduce transport costs, and agricultural programmes have supported the 
introduction of cash crops and the commercialisation of forest products.7 In addition to these 
market-led development interventions, remittance income associated with overseas migration 
has also contributed significantly to the region’s economy and to local residents’ spending 
power and material prosperity.  
 
[ILLUSTRATION 2 ABOUT HERE] 
 
The research was undertaken over two main field visits in 2014 and 2015. The first visit involved 
a survey of 117 households, 58 in Aurabani VDC and 59 in Prakashpur VDC to gather baseline 
information about the respondent households including their livelihoods and their perceptions 
of, and responses to, earthquake hazard and risk. The questionnaire was designed as a 
collaboration between scholars in the UK and a local NGO in Nepal, the National Society for 
Earthquake Technology-Nepal (NSET).8 The households surveyed were systematically selected 
across all nine wards in each VDC to minimise sampling bias. Following the survey 
questionnaire, 19 households (10 in Aurabani and 9 in Prakashpur) were purposively selected 
from the survey household roster for detailed follow-up interviews. Criteria used to select the 
households included their geographical location, caste/ethnicity and economic status including 
landownership and sources of income. The interview topics were used to situate, expand and 
explain the survey data, focusing on four areas of discussion: (i) the economic/livelihoods 
context of the household including livelihood diversity and sustainability, as well as household 
assets and consumption; (ii) the social context of the household including the extent to which 
family members supported and helped each other; (iii) the physical context, encompassing the 
exposure of the household to geophysical hazards as well as their access to markets; and (iv) the 
wider state context including local services and amenities available at the community level and 
the presence of the other development actors and organisations. 
 
The survey households were mixed in terms of their caste and ethnicity,9 but subsistence and 
semi-subsistence farming, complemented by non-farm work, dominated as livelihood activities 
                                                          
7
 https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/298721/Long-Term-
Impact-Dev-Study-Report-Koshi-Hills-Nepal.pdf 
8
 See http://www.nset.org.np/nset2012/.  
9
 David Gellner (2007) provides a summary of caste, ethnicity and inequality in Nepal. According to 
Gellner, Nepal’s caste system can be traced back to the autocratic Rana regime (1846-1951) when society 
was ordered according to orthodox Hindu notions with high caste groups (landowners, priests, 
administrators and policemen) and low caste, untouchable artisans (Dalits). The present day hill ethnic or 
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and as sources of income (Table 2). Few household heads were educated past secondary level, 
and over 60 per cent either had no education or were educated only to primary level. That said, 
relatively few self-defined themselves as ‘very’ poor, although most regarded themselves as of 
only ‘middling’ status in socio-economic terms. 
 
[TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
 
4. DISCUSSION 
 
4.1 Patterns of living and livelihoods 
Livelihoods in the two research VDCs, as they are in many parts of the global South, are 
increasingly multi-stranded and multi-sited (Table 3). Not one of our interviewed households 
relied on a single activity to meet their livelihood needs, whether that was farming or labouring, 
or working as a migrant or teacher. Security was delivered through managing a diversity of 
activities, and household livelihoods comprised an average of three elements, ranging from two 
to five. While farming remained important, in terms of simple number of activities, non-farming 
dominated livelihoods, making up over two-thirds of the total. Furthermore, while close to half 
of these elements (43 per cent) were home-based (whether farm or non-farm), 19 per cent 
involved daily work beyond the village, 6 per cent work in another area of Nepal, and 26 per 
cent work overseas. In terms of raw numbers, therefore, well over half of our respondents’ 
livelihoods were focused outside their village of residence. There has been a considerable 
delocalisation of livelihoods. 
 
[TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
 
4.2 Vulnerability 
The population of the research sites, in general, were vulnerable in livelihood terms. The 
environment was not a rich one, landholdings were small and declining, and natural hazards 
including both floods and earthquakes were real threats in the area. In addition, caste and 
gender inequalities exerted their influence, limiting opportunities for the lower castes and for 
women, while cultural norms such as wedding customs placed a significant burden on some 
poor and middle households. These vulnerabilities, while they were not set in stone, were 
persistent and long-standing. Perhaps reflecting the enduring nature of these constraints to 
building in situ sustainable livelihoods, migration to work in other places was a strategy that 
households have long had to entertain. While not all households were equally able to take 
advantage of such non-local opportunities, and the poor found it particularly hard to access the 
funds to finance international labour migration, the search for work beyond the village was an 
enduring theme in the area.10 Some of these inherited vulnerabilities were reflected in our 
survey and interviews.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                            
tribal groups were situated between the two. While the caste system has officially been abolished, de 
facto it continues to prevail and shape societal structures and interactions. 
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 Sunam and McCarthy (2016) note how much harder it is for the poor to access the considerable 
amounts needed to fund international labour migration, and the increase costs they incur and risks they 
face. They also, however, note that even poorer households find ways to work abroad. 
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Perhaps most notable were the effects of personal immobility, which continued to shape and 
limit opportunities for some households and individuals. In comparison to the hill districts, 
Aurabani and Prakashpur have good road connections to nearby urban centres but for the 
landless and land poor who relied on wage labouring to meet their basic needs, and families 
with caring responsibilities or where the de facto head was female, the issues of personal 
isolation and immobility were very real. Without a secure in situ livelihood delivered through 
ownership of, or access to land, such households often had little choice – particularly when local 
work opportunities were scarce – but to seek work  away from the local area. Of the 19 
households that we interviewed in detail, ten usually met their immediate staple food needs 
from own-account production and six were chronically food insecure in terms of own-account 
production.11 
 
Aarati (Interview code #2-2) belonged to just such a food insecure household in Aurabani. She 
and her husband had four children, and no land. They were reliant on day labouring work to 
survive and during the winter when local farm work was hard to come by they were forced to 
look further afield. Aarati’s husband sometimes travelled to the town of Biratnagar 30 km away 
to seek work and this meant that he could be absent for 10 days or more. While factory work 
was available locally around the town of Duhabi (10 km from Aurabani) and along the road to 
Biratnagar he would have struggled to make it to the factory early enough in the day to clock in, 
and the pay was too meagre to make it worthwhile staying away overnight from home.12  
 
Given the scarcity of land, the general increase in the number of households with sub-livelihood 
plots, and the growing pressure to earn cash to meet essential needs, the implications of 
relative personal immobility had grown. This is not to say that landlessness was a new condition 
in the area; some of our interviewee families had been landless for generations. What does 
seem to have occurred, however, is a shift from sharecropping to wage labouring as the primary 
means by which the landless made a living, at least locally. In the past, the landless would 
establish long-term relationships with a landowner and secure sharecropping rights to land. 
Today, sharecropping agreements – usually 50/50 in our research sites – were renewed each 
year and increasingly landowners were choosing to hire daily wage labour to work their land 
rather than enter into more permanent sharecropping agreements, because of a fear that 
sharecroppers might be awarded ownership rights. This increased the need for those without 
land to find income-earning opportunities beyond the local area. 
 
While the community obligations of the past – reflected in share-cropping agreements – may 
have partially unravelled, working against this trend was an increase in village farm labouring 
opportunities. The absence of so many villagers, whether as migrants overseas or as local 
workers, left some households short of labour. Kali (Interview code #9-11), a member of the 
Chaudhary caste and one of the larger landowners in the area with 6 bighas (3.6 ha) of land, 
struggled to manage his farm with all his children engaged in off-farm employment. He used a 
tractor to prepare his land but even so he said that finding labour was a struggle because so 
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 It is worth emphasizing, however, that households required a significant surplus to earn an income to 
meet the burgeoning cost of other essentials beyond food. This, more often than not, could not be 
secured through land-based production alone. 
12
 Farm labour and house construction in the Aurabani pays more, up to Rs 500/day, as opposed to Rs 
318/day for factory work. 
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many Aurabani villagers preferred to work in local factories rather than on the fields. The result 
was that wage rates had risen, tilting local power relations a small way in favour of labour as 
they negotiated with larger land owners over work.  
 
The role of traditional social support networks played out in other ways too. It was common for 
whole villages to move from the hills to the Terai together, taking their social support systems 
with them. A Dalit13 from the damai (tailor) caste explained that the high caste Brahmin 
households from his hill village in Khotang district moved first and given the good relations 
between the Dalits and Brahmins they decided to follow. These good relations continued with 
the Brahmin households supporting the Dalit tailor and his family by giving them work and social 
support, in effect a replication of relations as they formerly operated in Khotang. The head of 
the household interviewed felt that this traditional patronage relationship, known as bista,14 
offered some social protection to vulnerable households (Interview code #9-15). It is important 
to note, however, that while there are elements of inherited social protection within these 
traditional systems, they are also associated with extreme social discrimination including 
untouchability which has contributed to social vulnerability and poverty amongst particular 
caste groups, not least by limiting their livelihood opportunities (see, for example, Cameron, 
1998 and Sunam, 2014).              
 
The ultimate off-farm opportunity for men in the area – and in Nepal – was international labour 
migration. Among the small sample of households who we interviewed in detail, there were 
members working in Afghanistan, India, Malaysia, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and South Korea. 
Households without an adult male to be the de facto head in the absence of a (male) migrant 
were, however, constrained in their scope to engage in such migration. Several times we were 
told of the difficulties that female-headed households had to face as they struggled to manage 
in a man’s world, and the security concerns with which they had to contend (e.g. household #5-
5). 
 
While physical isolation and relative immobility remained a problem for some households – for 
economic and social reasons – the general story in the area was one of more transport 
infrastructure, improved access, and better services and facilities. Pushkar (Interview code #8-
7), the head of a relatively wealthy high caste hill Brahmin household who moved to Prakashpur 
in around 1980 from the hill district of Khotang noted how roads, clinics and schools had all 
proliferated in the area since his arrival (Illustration 3). Previously they were dependent on the 
town of Inaruwa for even basic services; now many of these were closer to hand. 
 
[ILLUSTRATION 3 ABOUT HERE] 
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 A low-caste group formerly considered “untouchable” (Gellner 2007).  
14 The term bista is used when a higher caste household or individual provides protection, social support 
or pay for annual services offered by a lower caste household or individual (for example, a tailor, 
blacksmith or shoe maker). A tailor, for instance, might be paid a fixed amount of food grain to provide 
tailoring services for the year to the higher caste bista family.  
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The area is susceptible to earthquakes, and risk perceptions will have been amplified following 
the Gorkha and Kodari earthquakes of April and May 2015, just a few months after our field 
research.15 It is significant, however, that earthquake risk was far down households’ lists of 
priorities and concerns when we undertook our survey in November 2014 and interviews in 
January 2015 (also see Sudmeier-Rieux et al., 2013).16 Of far greater concern to households was 
the risk of flooding from the Koshi River, particularly for interviewees in Prakashpur VDC which 
straddled the river.17 The 2008 Koshi floods affected much of Sunsari District (of which 
Prakashpur is a part). An embankment built and maintained by the Indian government now 
notionally protects the area but, even so, some respondents told us that they were actively 
seeking ways to leave the area such was their sense of exposure and level of concern.18  
 
In these ways, established vulnerabilities did find their continuing presence in contemporary 
livelihoods in our field sites: lack of land and the struggle to meet basic, existential needs; 
isolation, limited mobility and continuing difficulties in accessing services and amenities, at least 
for some households; and flood risk and, at the time of our research, the more distant threat 
posed by earthquakes. In that sense, some of the insecurities that households faced can be seen 
as long-standing inheritances of the past. It was also the case that development interventions 
had played a significant role in easing their severity. Most notably, improved transport 
infrastructure had widened households’ ability to connect with more distant places and to 
engage with work in such places. A degree of development in the local vicinity had also led to 
the growth of local employment opportunities. Moreover health, educational and service 
(power, water) provision had all markedly improved, notwithstanding Nepal’s evident and well-
established development failures. 
 
Market integration and development interventions have, therefore, done more than a little to 
ameliorate the vulnerabilities of the past, even if they had been far from eradicated in Aurabani 
and Prakashpur at the time of our field research. It is also tempting to assume that more of the 
same, in terms of development interventions, might eradicate the remaining vulnerabilities that 
households face. What is often overlooked in mainstream debates, however, is that such 
processes and the interventions that sit behind them have also sometimes injected precarity 
into the livelihood equation. 
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 In further fieldwork undertaken since the 2015 earthquakes it was quite clear that residents in the field 
sites were far more conscious of earthquake risk. They were interested to find out more about 
earthquake preparedness, thought this should be part of the school curriculum even at primary level, and 
also wished for masons’ training in earthquake resistant construction practices. 
16
 The previous earthquake mentioned to us occurred in 1988, which only caused minor damage. 
17
 Although we only surveyed and interviewed households on the left bank of the Koshi – the closest 
bridge is some way downstream. 
18
 One interviewee said that the fact that the Indian government maintained the embankment was 
reassuring; had the Government of Nepal constructed the embankment then, he told us, it would have 
failed many years back.   
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4.3 Precarity 
One of the greatest puzzles – and challenges – of the development process is that the 
evidently most successful path to faster economic growth, higher incomes and lower income 
poverty, namely through foregrounding the market imperative, also bestows new forms of 
vulnerability on marginal groups and poorer households in the global South. We term such 
new forms of vulnerability, precarity, to distinguish them from established and inherited 
vulnerabilities, as discussed above. In what ways, then, can households in Aurabani and 
Prakashpur be considered ‘precarious’ and how have these been produced against a 
backdrop of (slowly) improving conditions? 
 
The first area where we identify elements of precarity is in the changes that have been 
wrought to agriculture and farm systems, and the accompanying social relations of 
production. These occur in different ways, for different groups. Land owners complained of 
declining and unstable returns to farming, and rising costs while sharecroppers were worried 
that their long-standing relations with landowners were being eroded. In particular, when 
land was sold to outsiders this unsettled established norms of obligation and reciprocity, 
permitting the new owner a degree of latitude in managing the land either by farming it 
themselves or through engaging others as wage labourers. Farming, in other words, was 
changing from a way of life, with imbrications of social obligation, to a business where the 
profit motive was ascendant. 
 
Budh Narayan Yadav (Interview code #9-2), the head of a comparatively wealthy, landed 
household owning 3 bighas of rice land or around 2 ha explained the scissor effect that 
farming households like his were facing. Yields were, he told us, declining, which he put down 
to the effects of deforestation on water availability. To counteract the worsening 
environmental conditions (as he saw them), he was investing in chemical inputs – fertilizers 
and pesticides. While in the past he could produce enough without chemical inputs, now 
they were essential if he was to maintain production. He was caught, as it were, on a 
treadmill of declining yields demanding additional chemical inputs, requiring more cash, 
necessitating a larger surplus to recoup the investment in the crop, in turn needing greater 
production.  
 
While none of our respondents sought to explain it in this manner, this farming squeeze is, to 
a considerable extent, policy-induced. Decisions taken in Kathmandu regarding the nature 
and degree of farm support (price support for outputs, subsidisation of inputs, investment in 
irrigation), the character of agricultural extension (promotion of new seeds, fertilisers and 
other chemical inputs), and land policies with regard to tenancy, public land and 
sharecropping, all these become inscribed in the manner and form that farming took in the 
area. The views that were recounted to us about agriculture, then, including the risks and 
returns to farming, are reflective not just of the operation of the market but of a market 
shaped by a particular policy environment. 
 
Farming, in this way, was becoming riskier even for those few households with good-sized 
holdings. This was a key reason why people were looking to opportunities outside farming 
and beyond the local area. Farming was gradually losing its ability to deliver the income to 
support a socially acceptable level of subsistence; it was, in effect, becoming sub-livelihood 
not just because costs were rising and production declining, but because needs dictated by 
local custom were also growing. In addition, however, as many households reflected on the 
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low social status of farming as a profession as commented on the economic problems they 
faced.19 
 
Santidevi  (Interview code #4-1) explained to us why her son’s future was not that of a 
farmer. The younger generation, she told us, are not strong enough for the hard work of 
farming, and that having acquired a degree of education to waste that on farming would 
make little sense. In this way, education not only extends childhood into early adulthood but 
also makes people less suitable for a farming life and less enamoured of such a life. No one, 
Santidevi told us, wants to be a ‘finger print man’ or aautha chap (औठंा छाप) (i.e. one who 
cannot write his own name). It is through education that people can access non-farm work 
which can, in turn, she thought, secure their future. Eight of our interviewees specifically 
commented on the importance of education for livelihood security and parents struggled to 
find ways to better educate their children. The reality in the area, however, was that schools 
were poor, and that applied even to local private or ‘boarding’ schools. Furthermore, local 
opportunities for those with education were distinctly limited; education could only really be 
cashed in by leaving the area, whether for Kathmandu or overseas.   
 
The best means to do this in the view of most households – and, seemingly, a large proportion 
of the population of Nepal – is through international contract labour migration. In Aurabani’s 
Ward 5, 35 households were reported to have members working overseas at time of our field 
research, comprising around one-in-four households. Local work, while it might secure 
existential survival, generated too meagre a return to lever poor households into the category 
of non-poor, and the non-poor into the status of comfortably off. It was not, in other words, a 
strategy of accumulation. During one interview (Interview code #5-7), a group of villagers were 
of one voice in telling us that with local non-farm work it was a case of ‘earn today, spend today’ 
(aajai kamaune, ajjai kha [आजै कमाउने, आजै खाने]), or living from ‘hand-to-mouth’. By 
comparison to most local non-farm work, overseas employment not only permitted a degree of 
income accumulation, it also bestowed other advantages which can be set against the 
disadvantages of farming. When men returned from abroad, we were told by the same group of 
villagers, they looked good; they were strong physically and had a certain presence and 
confidence that came from living, working and being successful overseas. Overseas labour 
migration also, however, embodies certain risks and contributes to precarity. 
 
Most obviously, there are considerable up-front costs that have to be met: agents’ fees and 
flight and other associated (passport, health check) costs which characteristically amounted 
to Rp 150,000 (US$1,500). At times these costs were guaranteed against land and for our 
interviewees it took between 10 (Interview code #6-3) and 12 months (Interview code #6-4) 
to repay these debts – before the process of accumulation could even begin. Some borrowed 
funds from relatives to fund their sojourn overseas (Interview code #9-15), others had to 
resort to private money lenders where the rate of interest ranged from 3 per cent per month 
with collateral (a compound annual interest rate of 43 per cent) to 5 per cent per month 
without collateral (a compound rate of interest of 80 per cent). While the large majority of 
our respondents reported successful overseas migration forays, at least in economic terms 
(we did not focus on the emotional and social tensions that arise during absence and on 
return), there was one failed migration experience to Qatar (Interview code #6-4). While the 
household concerned managed to weather this failure, there are ample examples from 
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 In other, more remote areas of Nepal there has occurred large-scale land abandonment (see Paudel et 
al. 2014). 
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studies in Nepal and other countries reporting on the sometimes disastrous long-term 
livelihood effects of failed overseas migration forays (see Hewage et al. 2010, Sunam and 
McCarthy 2016). 
 
While young men from many of the landless and land poor households in the area sought to 
secure overseas work, partly because they could see little future in farm work with its poor 
returns and low status, the attractions of owning land, paradoxically, remained quite high. For 
many, if they were in a position to buy land, they would – although it was priced out of the 
reach of most and the traditional land tenure systems which continues to dominate works 
against the poor and marginalised. A distinction needs to be made between farming as an 
activity and the ownership of land – which might be physically worked by others. Land not only 
bestows prestige and has social transfer value, it is an investment, can be used as collateral (not 
least to fund overseas labour migration), and is a source of security in the context of 
uncertainty. The puzzling persistence of the small (sub-livelihood) landholding in contexts of 
sometimes deep and rapid economic transformation has been noted across Asia (Rigg et al., 
2016). 
 
Krishna (2010) in his work on India argues that the poor and near-poor are often ‘just one 
illness’ away from livelihood calamity. The development project, by making medical care a 
possibility but without, in most poor countries, providing universal health insurance to make 
that a risk-free reality has made the process of accessing medical care for some household’s 
deeply troubling. Krishna (2010: 87-95) terms this the ‘health-poverty trap’, when medical 
costs can be so far beyond a household’s capacity to pay that the effects are catastrophic for 
the future of the household.  
 
Santidevi (Interview code #4-1) was a 50 year-old wife, mother and de facto household head, a 
role that came her way when her husband, a respected secondary school teacher, suffered a 
brain haemorrhage in December 2013, leaving him paralysed and bed-ridden. To finance his 
medical care the family – formerly quite affluent in village terms – borrowed Rp 1 million 
(US$10,000). Half of this came from a bank, which demanded their land as collateral, and half 
from a money lender. From being very comfortably off and seemingly secure, the future of 
Santidevi’s family was, at the time of our interview, precarious. They had a large debt 
guaranteed against their one asset – their land – and the prospect that they might lose this land 
if they could not keep up with the payments. As Santidevi told us, she was worried about the 
future. Her husband used to handle everything; now she had to take on the role of household 
head, managing finances and the farm, and dealing with the hiring of labour. She was 
inexperienced in such matters, worried whether she could manage, and was fearful of what the 
future might hold.20 
 
4. Conclusion: between a rock and a hard place 
In this paper we have sought to distinguish between two forms of livelihood exposure, namely 
vulnerability and precarity. Both are forward-looking and predictive: they do not record a 
current state of being, but foretell what might – or could – be. We see the first, however, as 
reflecting back on the vulnerabilities that have long been a feature of living in this area of Nepal 
– indeed in many parts of the rural global South. Development, mainly in the guise of market 
integration albeit with some valuable interventions on the part of the Government of Nepal, has 
ameliorated some of these sometimes long established vulnerabilities but they nonetheless 
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 The possibility of spending large sum on medical bills was also explicitly mentioned by two other 
interviewees (Interview codes #9-2 and #9-12). 
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continue to be a feature of life and living in Aurabani and Prakashpur. Despite these 
vulnerability ‘successes’, this does not mean that households and individuals are necessarily 
more secure in terms of their futures, an essential element in the achievement of a sustainable 
livelihood. This is because there is a second approach to thinking about livelihood exposure, 
namely through the lens of precarity. This is ‘new’ in the sense that it derives from 
contemporary processes, some market-induced and some policy-induced.21 
 
Taking this discussion away from our field sites and from Nepal, Table 1 provides a listing of the 
kinds of exposure factors that lead to vulnerability on the one hand, and precarity on the other. 
The former, as noted earlier, we see as ‘inherited’ and the latter as ‘produced’. This distinction 
should not be seen as absolute, although we do think that it is a valuable one to make because 
it encourages a reflection on the causes of vulnerability/precarity and the consequences of the 
interventions that drive the development-as-modernisation agenda. Furthermore, while we 
have allocated factors to one or the other of the two columns, some cross over. Dispossession 
of land, for example, is hardly new, although there is a strong argument that accumulation by 
dispossession has intensified in the modern period in countries such as the Lao PDR (Kenney-
Lazar, 2012) and Ecuador (Veuthey and Gerber, 2012),22 and is closely tied to modernisation 
processes and the insinuation of capitalist relations into the countryside as land and coastal 
resources are capitalised. 
 
There are dynamic links between vulnerability and precarity and the manner of their association 
with wider development processes. For example, and referring back to our Nepal case: 
 
 In the past, physical isolation and relative immobility in Nepal were important barriers 
to livelihood improvement; 
 road construction and improving public and private transport and heightened levels of 
personal mobility have enabled households to engage with the world beyond the local 
area and the opportunities to be found there; and 
 this has raised incomes, reduced inherited vulnerabilities  and bolstered livelihoods. 
 
But, at the same time, these development interventions and effects have: 
 
 Commoditised land, raising its value and therefore making it harder for the young, land 
poor and landless to secure a land-based livelihood; 
 encouraged new land owners to change the basis of long-standing tenancy or 
sharecropping arrangements; 
 exposed international labour migrants to the risk of migration failure and high levels of 
debt; and; 
 thereby injected a degree of precariousness into livelihood profiles. 
 
There are specificities to this Nepal case, as there would be with any such study. We also 
believe, however, that it speaks to a wider set of issues. 
 
There is often a tendency to speak of ‘vulnerability’ as if it is a condition with common roots and 
manifestations. Just as Amartya Sen (1981) emphasised the need to think of the poor not as a 
singular army, but as a differentiated population with very different resource endowments, 
exposures and potentials, so too with the vulnerable and, therefore, vulnerability. Here we set 
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 We accept however that markets are shaped by policies. 
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 This is part of the ‘land grabbing’ debate. 
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out a simple distinction between vulnerability and precarity to draw attention to just one facet 
of such difference; the complexities go much further. Our concern is to direct attention to the 
ways in which mainstream development interventions can have contradictory effects. In taking 
advantage of the new opportunities that have arisen through development interventions based 
on the growth-generating logics of market integration, some of our households were becoming 
exposed in new ways. They were caught between, so to speak, the rock of vulnerability and the 
hard place of precarity. 
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Table 1: Drawing a line between vulnerability and precarity  
 Character of Exposure 
 Vulnerability (inherited exposure) Precarity (produced exposure) 
Environmental - Occupation of marginal, hazard 
prone land 
- Small landholdings 
- Steep, poor quality land in the 
hills which limits agricultural 
productivity 
- Absence of irrigation 
technologies 
- Dispossession of (and from) 
land 
- Commercial logging and 
associated soil degradation 
- Resettlement on marginal lands 
- Chemicalisation of agriculture 
- Loss of biodiversity 
Economic - High dependency on 
agriculture 
- Lack of access to credit 
- Lack of access to markets 
- Unsustainable levels of debt 
- Market dependencies 
- Growing inequalities between 
rich and poor 
- Out-migration 
Political and 
socio-cultural 
- Caste system and associated 
marginalisation 
- Gender divisions in society 
- Participatory exclusions 
- Lack of empowerment 
- Feudalism, lack of land reform 
- Erosion of the community 
covenant (moral economy) 
- Falling fertility rates, ageing 
population 
- Emergence of multi-sited 
households and crisis of care 
for elderly 
- Left-behind children 
Poverty Old poverty New poverty 
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Table 2: Survey household profiles, Prakashpur and Aurabani (2014) 
 Prakashpur Aurabani Combined 
Caste and ethnicity 
High caste 28.8 6.9 17.9 
Middle caste 13.6 22.4 17.9 
Low caste 30.5 50.0 40.2 
Hill-ethnic 27.1 20.7 23.9 
Education of household head 
Illiterate 22.0 22.4 22.2 
Literate 33.9 31.0 32.5 
Primary level 6.8 10.3 8.5 
Lower secondary level 23.7 13.8 18.8 
Upper secondary level 11.9 13.8 12.8 
University level 1.7 8.6 5.1 
Income sources (%) Primary  Secondary  Primary  Secondary  Primary  Secondary  
Subsistence farming 76.3 28.8 67.2 19.0 71.8 23.9 
Day wage labouring 10.2 6.8 19.0 19.0 14.5 12.8 
Formal employment 1.7 3.4 8.6 12.1 5.1 7.7 
Own business 6.8 11.9 1.7 6.9 4.3 9.4 
Other work 5.1 22.0 3.4 15.5 4.3 18.8 
Other 0.0 27.1 0.0 27.6 0.0 27.4 
 
Source: survey, 2014 
Note: examples of caste groups represented among our interviewees were: low caste: Rishidev 
(or Mushar) and Uranw; Middle caste: Chaudhary (Tharu) and Yadav; high caste: Brahmin and 
Chhetri. 
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Table 3: The elements that make up livelihoods in Aurabani and Prakashpur 
  Home Village Local 
National 
(non-
local) 
Inter-
national Total % 
Farm 14  0 0  1 0  15 32 
Non-farm 6 3 9 2 12 32 68 
Total 21 3 9 2 12 47 100 
% 43 6 19 6 26 100   
 
Notes: this table records the number of separate elements that comprised household 
livelihoods among the interviewed households. Non-local work is only included here if it 
involves remittances to the natal household. 
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Figure 1: Poverty in Nepal, 1985-2010 
 
  
 
Source: World Bank poverty and inequality databank 
(http://povertydata.worldbank.org/poverty/country/NPL)  
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Figure 2: Sunsari District and the research sites of Aurabani and Prakashpur  
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Illustration 1: Sunsari District 
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Illustration 2: Traditional housing in Aurabani 
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Illustration 3: A daily market at the roadside between Aurabani and Duhabi 
 
 
 
 
 
